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ULTRALIGHT AIRCRAFT: A NEED FOR BETTER
REGULATION THAN 14 C.F.R. § 103
RICHARD H. JACK*
IN SEPTEMBER, 1983, Dick Rowley of Colorado
Springs, Colorado, set a new altitude record for ul-
tralight vehicles. His Mitchell U-2 Superwing climbed to
25,940 feet. He had cooperation from the Federal Avia-
tion Administration's Denver ARTC "Center", (traffic
control), which cleared him to 30,000 feet. Because Den-
ver Center had trouble radar-imaging Rowley, Rowley in-
stalled cardboard radar reflectors within his craft's wings.'
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM
On October 4, 1982, the Federal Aviation Agency
("FAA") promulgated a new regulation that defined all
flying machines with certain weight and performance lim-
its as an "ultralight vehicle."' 2 This regulation exempts
* Mr. Jack graduated from the University of Georgia School of Law in 1983,
and holds a B.S. from the University of Florida (1969) and an M.A. from the Uni-
versity of Central Florida (1973). He practices law with the Athens, Georgia firm
of Jack and Jack. He also holds a private pilot certificate.
I "Pilot News," AOPA Pilot, Dec. 1983, at 22.
2 14 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1985). The definitional portion of the regulation reads as
follows:
For the purposes of this part, an ultralight vehicle is a vehicle that:
(a) Is used or intended to be used for manned operation in the air by
a single occupant; (b) Is used or intended to be used for recreation
or sport purposes only; (c) Does not have any U.S. or foreign airwor-
thiness certificate; and (d) If unpowered weighs less than 155 lbs.; or
(e) If powered: (1) weighs less than 254 pounds empty weight, ex-
cluding floats and safety devices intended for deployment in a po-
tentially catastrophic situation; (2) Has a fuel capacity not exceeding
5 U.S. gallons; (3) Is not capable of more than 55 knots calibrated
415
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vehicles within the specified limits from regulations which
apply to all other aircraft. It exempts ultralight vehicles
from two important requirements: (1) that the operator
be certified as a pilot by the FAA, and (2), that the vehicle
be certified as airworthy. Each exemption constitutes a
serious flaw in the regulation.
Ultralight vehicles represent a four-fold hazard when
flown by an untrained pilot. They are a hazard to the pilot
himself, to anyone or anything accompanying the pilot, to
those on the ground, and to anything which happens to
meet an ultralight in the air. This paper does not deal
with the problems faced by the pilot. If a person volunta-
rily climbs into an ultralight and kills himself, a court
would be likely to consider that he assumed the risk. The
paper also does not deal with the problem of hazard to
the passenger or cargo. The regulation encompasses
neither vehicles that are used by more than one occupant
nor vehicles used for commercial purposes such as car-
riage of cargo.4 The hazard to those on the ground is real
enough, but the magnitude of harm and probability of oc-
currence are both relatively low. Except to the extent that
harm to persons or property on the ground may result
from an ultralight collision, the third hazard is ancillary to
this paper. This article focuses on the fourth hazard -
danger to other aircraft and their occupants. The pres-
ence of ultralights at high altitudes creates this danger,
but the regulatory flaws magnify the hazard. The danger
which ultralights pose to other aircraft results largely
from pilot ignorance, a direct result of the regulatory
sanction of untrained pilots.
In Part I, this article discusses the evolution of aviation,
especially the development of ultralight vehicles and the
airspeed at full power in level flight; and (4) Has a power-off stall
speed which does not exceed 24 knots calibrated airspeed.
Id.
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68 (5th ed.
1984).
4 14 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1985).
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legislative history of civil aviation safety regulation.' In
Part II, it discusses the various remedies available to cor-
rect the problem, emphasizing judicial review.6 Finally, it
offers some relatively simple suggestions to mitigate the
worst of the hazards.7
The catastrophic nature of an accident between an ul-
tralight and another aircraft can be readily illustrated by a
hypothetical "worst case." A pilot, ignorant of the Fed-
eral Aviation Regulations,8 and either lacking in common
sense or induced by altitude or rapture, takes off from a
local parking lot and flies his new ultralight over to "the
airport." The airport could be any major field and the
ultralight could be flying at night or in poor weather.
Some small distance out from the field he encounters a
twin-engined, commercial jet. He and his "toy" are in-
gested into one turbine engine, causing the engine to lose
power or explode. The crippled jet crashes into the ur-
ban area which typically surrounds airports served by
commercial aircraft. 9
5 See infra notes 40-105 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 106-171 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 173-187 and accompanying text.
8The Federal Aviation regulations are contained in title 14 of the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations.
Although an exploding or disintegrating engine could destroy control sur-
faces, causing catastrophe, a large commercial jet could probably be struck any-
where or lose one engine without causing it to crash. But this worst case is not
mere speculation, for air disaster, due to loss of power from ingestion of lesser
objects than an ultralight have caused havoc. The hail ingestion caused 1979
crash of a Delta Air Line Douglas DC-9 at Dallas, Georgia. The ingestion of
seagulls caused a Gates Learjet-35 to crash on takeoff over a city dump at DeKalb-
Peachtree Airport, Atlanta, Georgia, in 1973. See Sellfors v. DeKalb County, 278
S.E.2d 489 (1981). A recent report by the National Transportation Safety Board
("NTSB") on the ultralight problem notes that, "[o]ne concern about ultralight
operations is the hazard they pose to other airspace users and to persons and
property on the ground." NTSB Safety Study 85/01 (PB85-917001), Ultralight
Vehicle Accidents, at 20 (1985) (hereinafter cited as NTSB Safety Study). Of the
177 ultralight vehicle accidents studied through September, 1984, only twenty per
cent resulted in damage to property, mostly trees, crops, wires and poles, and, in
two cases vehicles. NTSB Safety Study at 20.
The NTSB is an independent advisory agency within the Dept. of Transporta-
tion, controlled by 49 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1907 (1982). It draws conclusions regard-
ing the probable cause of accidents and makes formal recommendations to
prevent their reoccurence to the Secretary of Transportation concerning regu-
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This paper argues that in view of the history of aviation
and the somewhat lagging development of aviation law,
section 103 should be modified by the FAA to remove the
flaws that could ultimately lead to the worst case.' 0 This
paper suggests strongly that Congress and the states have
intended air law to prevent or redistribute the conse-
quences of precisely the type of hazards exacerbated by
the flaws of section 103."1 This paper also suggests reme-
dies available to interested parties should the FAA choose
either not to acknowledge the existence of the problem,
or to acknowledge the problem but elect not to modify
section 103.12
The preference for personal liberty over social regula-
tion underlies the decision not to require minimum per-
formance standards for these pilots and vehicles. This
paper now examines the tension between these two
objectives in the field of civil aviation.
II. EVOLUTION OF CIVIL AVIATION
A consideration of the background of man's expressed
desire to fly is helpful in understanding the nature of the
problem examined by this monograph. Man appears de-
termined to overcome his surroundings and leave the face
of the Earth. This bald premise underlies one side of the
problem addressed here. The nature of a libertarian soci-
ety permits its members to one degree or another to pur-
sue their dreams, even to the point of folly.'
3
Permissiveness is particularly apparent when those who
do not share the folly are not injured by another's pursuit
lated modes of transportation. 49 U.S.C. § 1902 (b)(5) (1982). When the NTSB
issues such a recommendation, the Secretary must respond within ninety days, in
detail, but may refuse to accept the recommendation. 49 U.S.C. § 1906(3) (1982).
10 See infra notes 106-187 and accompanying text.
'1 See infra notes 107-118 and accompanying text.
,2 See infra notes 124-172 and accompanying text.
13 It is not the intention of this paper to prove these premises. The proofs are
evident and extend into prehistory. See generally N. MATTE, TREATISE ON AIR-AER-
ONAuriCAL LAw 15 (1981). For ease of reference, the urge to fly is called the
"Icarus complex" in this paper, from the Hellenic myth of Icarus and Daedalus.
Id. at 16, 281.
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of it; or when the pursuit satisfies certain perceived needs
of the society, then the society tends to not only permit
but encourage the folly.
In aviation, the Icarus complex has led many to break
their figurative or literal necks, in pursuit of folly.14 Soci-
ety has tolerated aviation fools for military and economic
reasons, but it tends to step in when another's neck may
be broken as well. Aviation law is the result. Aviation and
aviation law have developed hand in hand.
The first recorded flight was made 200 years ago in
1783, by the Montgolfier Brothers of Paris. 15 The first
manned flight came three months later on November 21,
1783.16 A rapidly developing craze swept Europe as man
made the Icarus complex come true and discovered the
rapture of flight. The craze also resulted in the first air
law statute. In 1784, in the city of Durham England, for-
bade the use of balloons over the city. 17 Paris police re-
quired inspection of balloons as of April 23, 1784, issuing
the first airworthiness certificate.' 8
As with the technological developments of the early
19th century, aviation law developed from the application
of existing common law to novel fact situations. The first
reported aviation law decision in any country, Guille v.
14 For example, Otto Lilienthal, a German glider designer, died in the crash of a
glider in 1896.
15 Their unmanned balloon the "Globe" was set into free flight. Landing in a
suburban area, it so terrified local farmers that they, believing it to be a demon,
attacked it with muskets and pitchforks, and dragged the canvas bag behind a cart
through the streets to assure all the demon was dead. The first air flight resulted
in the first aviation tort.
16 Among the viewers was Benjamin Franklin. By the first of the following year
Franklin had devised a military application for the novelty. Matte, supra note 13,
at 21.
17 The Invention of Lighter-than-Air Craft in France - in One Astonishing Year,
1783, AIR & SPACE, May-June 1979, at 3.
18 1 C. SHAwcRoss & K. BEAUMONT, AIR LAw 1 (4th ed. 1977). If for no other
reason, Paris required inspections because the balloons were driven by fire, and
cities were flammable. Curiously, on the 200th anniversary of the first flight, a
bicentennial celebration was held in Paris. A replica of "Globe" was sent aloft.
Although the aviators were prepared for the problem, it too developed a small
fire.
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Swan 19 is typical of the parallel development of technol-
ogy and law, so much so as to be almost an unremarkable
case.2 0  A fundamental rule of aviation law holds that
those who set things into the air are liable when those
things come down on the heads of others.2'
Strict liability is not the rule in all aircraft cases, but is
particularly appropriate in cases involving "abnormal"
aviation such as stunt flying and experimental aircraft.22
Aviation law is becoming, in turn, the root for space law.
Liability for damages caused by debris returning from
space is placed on the government responsible for placing
it into space. 3 When private parties place objects in
space, the liability will surely follow when those objects
return.24
Aviation accidents enhance an individual's capacity for
breaking another's neck for two primary reasons. First,
the nature of the technology involves tremendous poten-
tial energies which manifest themselves into kinetic form
- 19 Johns. 381 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822).
20 Swan took his balloon up, got into trouble, and started yelling for help. A
crowd followed in pursuit, and chased the balloon into Guille's vegetable garden.
The balloon did relatively little damage, but the crowd trampled the garden flat.
The court analogised from Scott v. Shepherd, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (1773) and held
that Swan, having set the destructive force - the crowd-in motion, was liable
for damages the force caused. Guille, 19 Johns. at 381. Precisely the same situa-
tion arose when the American ballon "Double Eagle II" landed in a French farm-
yard in 1980.
23 W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 516.
22 Id. Such cases utilize the causation doctrine established in Rylands v.
Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) (holding landowner strictly liable for damage
caused to an adjacent property owner's coal mine when a reservoir constructed on
the landowners land broke through its bottom and flooded the mine.)
23 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S.
The treaty places liability on the nation responsible for launching the object,
whether launched by that nation's government or by any parties therein. An in-
ternational claims commission assesses and adjusts damages. France, a spacefar-
ing nation, is not among the signatories.
24 See, e.g., Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d, 774, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 128 (1967) (firing of 350,000 lb. thrust aerospace engine by private party
creates trespass liability for seismic damage to well and water table). Berg v. Thi-
okol Chem. Corp., 37 N.J. 396, 181 A.2d 487 (1962)(nuisance cause of action
created when house structure damaged by sonic emmissions from privately owned
50,000 lb. thrust aerospace engine.)
without warning as to time or place, often in mysterious
ways. Second, air accidents can involve large numbers of
people who die or are maimed in lurid ways through abso-
lutely no fault of their own.25 The staggering, random
horror of a major air accident is a mere result of the tech-
nology which made aviation possible.
To prevent that horror, the United States has set up a
large body of regulations, codified in part in Title 14 of
the Code of Federal Regulations, establishing standards
for the machines, their operators, and their operations.
As changes in technology make the regulations obsolete,
the rules may discourage progress. The FAA attempts to
keep up with the technology, but the rule-making process
itself bars rapid response to rapid change.26 In the con-
text of ultralight vehicles, technology has moved rapidly
ahead of the rules, presenting dangers not anticipated in
the normal course of the rule-making process. Other no-
table technical advances in electronics, structural materi-
als and fuel sources, will create more legal anachronisms.
A. Ultralight Technology
The ultralight is, in most respects, a reinvention of the
airplane. One of the first alternatives to the all-metal, gas-
hog, general aviation aircraft was Francis L. Rogallo's
"Rogallo Wing," first used in 1951. The vehicle became
popular in California in the early 1970's, largely because
applicable regulations were lax, and it was cheap.27 It was
simple enough: the flier merely strapped himself under-
neath a large, untethered kite/glider and ran off a cliff.
The inventive types soon strapped a chainsaw engine and
25 Assumption of the risk doctrine has been discredited for the commercial air
traveller since the 1940's and never applied to those on the ground. For discus-
sion of ultrahazardous nature of air travel see W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at § 78 n.
82.
26 According to the FAA, the considerations which led to promulgation of 14
CFR § 103 began eight years before final notice of the rule was published. The
first publication by the FAA on the subject was (Advisory Circular) ("AC")
Number 60-10 entitled Recommended Safety Parameters for Operation of Hang Gliders.
This regulation was promulgated on May 16, 1974.
27 A second alternative is the homebuilt, experimental class aircraft, covered by
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a small propeller to the hang glider, manufacturing the
first modern ultralight. Of course, the competitive types
used bigger engines, and the race that had begun in 1903
resumed.
The capacities of ultralight flying machines increased,
as did the capacities of the unpowered hang gliders from
which they descended. The FAA reports that ultralights
are capable of sustained airspeeds exceeding 50 knots at
altitudes above 10,000 feet.28 They are probably capable
of a much higher performance. In addition to the greater
capability, they are becoming increasingly difficult to de-
tect by air traffic control radar. 29 In another recent tech-
nological advance, a one flier has attached an engine and
pilot's seat to the shrouds of a controllable parachute,
such that the pilot and engine are suspended beneath the
parachute but are capable of driving it forward. The en-
tire device, called a "paraplane," weighs less than 150 lbs.
14 C.F.R. § 21.191(g) (1985). These craft must be certified by the FAA as to
airworthiness, and the pilot must carry an appropriate Airman Certificate. Id.
These vehicles are distinct from the ultralight aircraft, and not the subject of
this article.
A third alternative, recently receiving increased media exposure, is the free, or
hot-air balloon. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 31, 61.117-19, 101 (1985). (Section 31 governs
airworthiness requirements, Section 101 regulates operations, and Section
61.117-119 established requirements for pilot certification). Compare 14 C.F.R.
§ 103 (1985) (regulating ultralight vehicles).
28 47 Fed. Reg. 38,770 (1982) (containing supplementary information for 14
C.F.R. § 103). The FAA defines ultralights, in part, as vehicles not capable of
exceeding 55 knots at full power in level flight. 14 C.F.R. § 103.1(e)(3)(1985). See
supra note 2 for the full definition of ultralight vehicles under the regulation.
29 Use of fiberglass or carbon fiber structural components instead of highly ra-
dar-reflective aluminum has contributed to this phenomenon. Soon even the en-
gines may not be composed of metals. Ford Motor Co. and Polimoter, Inc. of
New Jersey have developed a prototype automobile racing engine in which the
engine block is composed of carbon-fiber-resin. 26 AOPA PILOT No. 11, 30.
(Nov. 1983). This engine, using the resin now trademarked by Amoco Chemicals
as "Torlon," was campaigned in a Lola racing car in the winter of 1985. The 168-
lb. engine produces 318 horsepower at 9500 rpm in a 2-litre, four cylinder, dual
overhead cam configuration. Torlon parts included connecting rods, intake valve
stems, piston pins, skirts, timing gears, valve spring retainers and tappets.
MECHANICAL ENGINEERING, Mar. 1985 at 89. Collateral developments at General
Motors, Carborundum and Cummins Diesel Corporations of ceramic parts could
replace even the few metallic internal components. Dizard, The Amazing Ceramic
Engine Draws Closer, FORTUNE, July 25 1983, at 76. A combination of these two
components would render an aircraft virtually invisible to radar.
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and can be folded neatly into the trunk of a sportscar3 °
The availablity of such technologically advanced machines
to the adventuresome members of a libertarian society
has resulted in sales of approximately 20,000 ultralight
devices in the United States alone.'
A recent National Transportation Safety Board
("NTSB") Safety Study summarizes the engineering as-
pects of ultralight accidents in a sanitary litany of horror.
Of 177 accidents occuring in the 18 month 1983-84 study
period, 88 accidents resulted in 93 fatalities.32 The report
assures that the lack of mandatory non-fatal accident re-
sults in the low figures for the number of accidents. 33
The report studied the factors contributing to the acci-
dents. Of all the studied accidents, thirty-two per cent re-
sulted from airframe failure due to overstress, poor
maintenance, or poor design.34 Of the fatal accidents,
forty-two per cent resulted from loss of control by the pi-
lot.35 This rate compares with twenty-eight per cent for
general aviation accidents. 36 A third factor, overall opera-
tor experience, did not appear to be as serious a problem
as lack of time at the controls of the particular machine.
The machines appear to be very touchy, making it easy to
become a victim of "improper handling techniques. '
37
Ninety-three per cent of ultralight accidents did not oc-
cur in controlled airspace, and none in a Terminal Con-
30 Marden, The Bird Men, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Aug. 1983, at 198, 214. Current
commercial and local governmental uses include aerial pesticide application and
police observation. Id. at 214.
31 Parke, Washington. Regulators Tackle the Ultralights, FLYING, Feb. 1982, at 56.
The United States Army purchased three ultralights for evaluation. Each can
carry three infantrymen, or 500 lbs. in equipment, and is capable of firing antitank
missles. Rotec Broadens its Ultralight Market, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., July 18, 1983,
at 89.
32 NTSB Safety Study, supra note 9, at 4.
3 Id. at 5. Some fatal accidents are reported only through police agencies.
34 Id.
3 Id. at 6.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 11.
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trol Area or Stage III Terminal Radar Service Area,38
indicating that additional general pilot training would not
alleviate the problem presented in this paper. However,
there are some interesting "near miss" and "safety haz-
ard" statistics reported by the National Aeronautics &
Space Administration's ("NASA") Aviation Safety Report-
ing System (admittedly a limited and non-rigorous report-
ing system) to the NTSB. Over a six-year period thirty-
nine reports concerning thirty-four incidents involving ul-
tralights were filed. Of these, sixteen were reported since
regulation began. Of the thirty-four reports, thirty in-
volved near misses in midair. And of those thirty, thirteen
involved transport category aircraft. 9
The NTSB's conclusions do not directly address the
thesis of this paper. The NTSB indicates that training
and better engineering are necessary to protect the pilot
from himself. However, this article focuses on protecting
the public from the pilot, who may name his own poison as
he might please.
B. Development of Aviation Law
Responding to a perceived need, governments devel-
oped a body of aviation law. In developing aviation com-
mon law, the various state legislatures acted in a
piecemeal fashion until 1922, when the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws approved
the Uniform State Law for Aeronautics.40 In the fourteen
years following approval of the Act, twenty-one states
adopted it.4 I Additional uniform laws were promulgated
38 These areas are specially controlled airspaces which characterize the high
density traffic patterns near large cities.
so NTSB Safety Study, supra note 9, at 22. The three reports reprinted by the
NTSB study reveal the concerns faced by pilots who discover their lives
threatened by someone they perceive as a thrill-seeking idiot.
40 1928 U.S. Av. Rep. 472. A table of citation and the state statutes embodying
the Uniform State Law of Aeronautics can be found at 1936 U.S. Av. Rep. 326.
4 Delaware, Hawaii, Michigan, Nevada, North Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and
Vermont adopted the Act in 1923. 1936 U.S. Av. Rep. 376. The other states that
adopted the Act included Arizona, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mis.
souri, Montana, NewJersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
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by the Commission, however, the state acceptance rate
declined.4 2 Additionally, some states enacted their own
aviation statutes.43
The federal government exercised no control over avia-
tion until the outbreak of World War I in 1914, when its
potential use as a weapon became apparent.44 On March
3, 1915, the Naval Appropriations Act became law with a
rider which established the Advisory Committee for Aero-
nautics ("NACA"). This committee was charged with the
"scientific study of problems of flight with a view to their
practical solutions. ' 45 The committee's primary function
was the development of American military air power.46
By the end of the World War I, NACA recommended
the enactment of legislation controlling civil aviation,47
but Congress passed no legislation. In 1918, however,
NACA persuaded the Post Office Department to set up an
airmail service.48 The limitations on civil aviation became
apparent through the problems encountered by this new
service and by the financial problems encountered by en-
trepreneurs of new commercial airline companies.49 In
Dakota, and Wisconsin. Id. Several legislatures made minor revisions on the text,
however, the original text can be found at 1928 U.S. Av. Rep. 472.
42 See, e.g., Uniform Air Licensing Act (1930)(8 states).
4- A digest to the various state laws is located at 1944 U.S. Av. Rep. 131.
44 D. WHITNAH, SAFER SKYWAYS, FEDERAL CONTROL OF AVIATION (1966).
4- The Naval Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 271, 38 Stat. 928 (1915).
46 Whitnah, supra note 44, at 8.
47 Id. at 9.
48 Air Mail service began in 1918, with Army pilots flying the mail. Id. at 13. In
1925, Congress enacted the Air Mail Act to encourage commercial aviaitors and
authorize the Postmaster General to allow airmail service. Air Mail Act of 1925,
Pub. L. No. 359, 43 Stat. 805 (1925). Orville Wright, in commenting on the need
for the Air Commerce Act said:
The greatest present drawback to the use of aircraft for civil pur-
poses, such as commerce, mail, travel and sport, is the lack of suita-
ble airports and emergency landing fields. Money spent by the
National Government in helping to provide these fields, on the
equipping of the airports properly, in marking and lighting the air-
ways, and providing radio or other means of directing the course
and in furnishing meteorological reports to as many of the fields as
is necessary, will be money well spent and will some day bring large
rewards.
S. REP. No. 2, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1925).
49 One example of an airline which operated without any govermental supervi-
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1919, NACA drafted a bill which would have authorized
the Department of Commerce to license pilots, inspect
aircraft, and supervise airfield usage.5" Although Presi-
dent Wilson submitted the bill to Congress, no action was
taken.5 ' In Europe, however, governments regulated and
generously subsidized civil aviation. 52 In 1919, the Inter-
national Convention on Air Navigation met in Paris to set
forth a body of rules, "recognizing the progress of aerial
navigation. . . appreciating the necessity of an early
agreement upon. . .rules. . .to encourage. . . peaceful
intercourse. ' 53 These rules were signed by each major
power except the United States.
The first federal safety legislation proposed in the rap-
idly expanding field of post-World War I civil aviation was
the Wadsworth Bill.54 By the time the House was ready to
act, the Senate substituted the Bingham-Parker Bill for
the Wadsworth Bill.55 The House and Senate ironed out
their differences, and the resulting legislation became the
Air Commerce Act of 1926.56
The legislative history of the Air Commerce Act dem-
onstrates that the Senate emphasized the business of fly-
ing while the House emphasized safety. The Senate
Report stated:
Although Americans built the first airplanes capable of
sustained flight and were the first to learn how to fly heav-
sion or safety regulations was the St. Petersburg-Tampa Airboat Line which
served these two cities in 1914. Whitnah, supra note 44 at 14.
o R. BURKHARDT, THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 6 (1967).
Id.
•52 D. Whitnah, supra note 44 at 15.
5 Air Navigation Convention, October 13, 1919, 226 Consolidated Treaty Se-
ries 246 (1919). The provisions of this convention include the requirement of the
familiar "N" for American aircraft, the requirement of airworthiness certificates,
airframe, powerplant and operations logbooks, navigation lights, rules of the air,
right-traffic in airport traffic areas, ground signals, minimum altitudes, airport
traffic areas, certification procedures for aircrews, including medical certificates,
flight tests and examination for general aeronautical knowledge. Id. at 246-71.
S. 76, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921).
S. 41, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. (1926).
'6 Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926) ("to en-
courage and regulate the use of aircraft in commerce, and for other purposes").
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ier-than-air machines and hold more world's records than
do citizens of any other nation, commercial aviation has
not advanced as rapidly in the United States as had been
hoped and expected.
Travelers to Europe find that it is possible to fly in comfort
and at regular intervals between the principal capital cit-
ies. Insurance rates for passengers and freight when car-
ried by airplane are far lower in Germany than in the
United States. Insurance rates on valuables carried from
Paris to London by air are very much less than by the
usual methods of transportation. All the leading Euro-
pean countries have been willing to promote commercial
aviation. We have done practically nothing. It is no secret
that in England and France commercial aviation is safer
than in the United States.
It is no secret that France and England are spending more
money on aviation than we are. [emphasis added]57
The emphasis on insurance rates and safety records
continues in the report:
American insurance companies do not yet feel warranted
in giving as low rates for freight and passengers when
transported by air in the United States as they do in Eu-
rope. Evidently American commercial aviation has not
made as satisfactory progress as it should have made. The
principal reason appears to be a failure. . .of the United
States to. . . encourage and regulate the use of aircraft in
commerce.
58
The report discusses the aviation advances made in Eu-
rope,59 then proceeds with a discussion of the effects of
unregulated flying in the United States. 60 Bingham's re-
57 S.REP. No. 2, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1925).
-' Id. at 1.
-% Id. Particularly noted are advances in Germany, which the United States had
just spent a considerable sum of money to help defeat. Id.
- Id. at 2, citing The Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce, 1925 Aircraft Year
Book. The report notes that there were three hundred deaths and five hundred
injuries in the post war years. In 1924 the U.S. Army logged 900,000 miles in its
model airways system without a fatality. Id. at 2. Even the United States Post
Office air mail service had a fatality rate of one per 463,000 miles, in what was a
definitely risky business. Id. By contrast, in 1924, civilian aviation logged about
1986] 427
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port continues, "One result of these frequent accidents
has been a widespread fear of the hazards of the air which
makes it difficult to secure passengers and virtually impos-
sible to secure insurance." 6'
What the report does not say is that because the Ameri-
can carriers could not obtain the twin markets of cargo
and passengers, foreign carriers were beginning to appear
in the United States. 62  Many factors were obviously ag-
gregating to prod Congress into action. But safety and
the economic losses appear to take a higher profile than
even the military aspects.63
1,000,000 miles with seventy-five fatalities and ninety-one injured. Id. Bingham
notes that this is one fatality per 13,500 miles. Id. As the report dryly points out,
"the inference is obvious." Id.
('] Id. This is hardly understated. One contemporary report from a reputable
publication noted that of 470 crashes resulting in 221 deaths from 1920-1923,
inexperienced pilots or cheap and unsafe equipment caused ninety-one percent.
Uncle Sam as Air Boss, THE NATION, Nov. 26, 1924, at 559.
11 The 1926 House Report, which proposes a new enabling clause, deals with
this. H.R. REP. No. 572, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1926). The Secretary of Com-
merce, who was to administer the law, could exempt from the regulations of sec-
tion 2 (dealing with inspection) aircraft registered in any foreign nation, but such
unregulated aircraft could not engage in interstate commerce. They would have
had to comply with American regulations, a small handicap for them, thus giving
the Americans a slight edge in economic competition. There is some ambiguity
about intentions and actions in the House report, possibly a result of tension be-
tween the need for a functional law and the need for politically correct statements
for consumption by the electorate. Section 6 of the enabling clause allows for
foreign operations in interstate commerce provided the aircraft and aircrews are
regulated. But the "Outline of Provisions" in the House Report states flatly that
"Foreign-owned aircraft are forbidden to engage in interstate commerce." Id. at
9. Whether this is a slip-up in editing or merely a way for certain legislators to
pass needed laws while maintaining appearances for their constituents (as if to
say, "See, we voted pro-American to keep American jobs for Americans and those
other people out.") is difficult to tell fifty-six years later. For an interesting com-
mentary on the duality of the legislative process, being simultaneously concerned
with law and social good and with political exigency, see R. NEELY, How COURTS
GOVERN AMERICA (1981).
vl Military considerations have always been important to aviation, as high-
lighted by Dr. Franklin's response to the Montgolfier balloon. See supra note 16.
The first combat use of an aircraft was a moored observation balloon used by the
Republican French Army at the battle of Fleurus. MATTE, supra note 13, at 93. It is
astonishing in retrospect how shortsighted Americans generally appeared to be as
to the military uses, especially compared to European nations, even among milita-
rists with technological backgrounds, such as Hudson Maxim (mechani-
cal/chemical engineer). "Aviation makes a strong appeal to the imagination, and
this fact. . .has lead to many strange predictions and weird conclusions about the
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Reflectively, although Bingham and his followers be-
lieved they saw the future of aviation (and they probably
did if compared to their colleagues who kept forestalling
passage of regulation), in fact they had no realistic vision
of its future growth. For example, in outlining which of
destruction dirigibles and aeroplanes would be capable of doing by dropping
bombs from the sky [including] destruction of warships. . .fortifications and large
cities. . . .The hopes of those who [believe] in such dire destruction [are mis-
placed]." H. MAxiM, DEFENSELESS AMERICA 205, 206 (1915). Aside from the use
of observation balloons by the Army Signal Corps and the handful of men who
operated them, no one seemed aware of the potential even after World War I. In
the prewar years from 1908-1913 the United States spent a total of $435,000 to
build a force of 28 aircraft. By comparison: Germany, $28 million, 400 craft;
France $22 million, 400 craft; Russia, $12 million, 300 craft; Italy, $8 million, 200
craft. Even Japan, Bulgaria and Greece had 80 craft each. R. BURLINGAME, GEN-
ERAL BILLY MITCHELL 61 (1952). That the Europeans recognized them as offen-
sive war machines is demonstrated in the first Hague Peace Conference (1899),
187 Consolidated Treaty Series 456 (July 29) in which 28 nations solemnly agreed
to not use balloons for gun platforms or bombardment purposes. The Second
Hague Conference (1907), 205 Consolidated Treaty Series 403 (Oct. 18), ex-
tended the prohibition to aircraft.
Some Americans, notably Billy Mitchell, did forsee the future in a way senior
military and legislative leaders, who followed Maxim's thinking, did not. In the
opinion of U.S. Naval experts, the German Dreadnaught "Ostfriesland" was un-
sinkable by aircraft, having survived a considerable pounding at the battle ofJut-
land by British battleships. A war prize to be sunk, the ship was turned over to
Mitchell, along with two American battleships, U.S.S. Virginia and NewJersey, for
target practice. On July 24, 1921, Mitchell sank the "Ostfriesland", in sixteen
minutes, with bombs larger than the senior military had decided an airplane was
capable of carrying. BURLINGAME, supra, at 1-12. The New Jersey and Virginia
were sunk by Mitchell on September 25, 1923, the latter by a single, devastating
bomb dropped from 3,000 feet. NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER, 7 DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN NAVAL FIGHTING SHIps 542 (1981). Not only did the leadership still
refuse to acknowledge the advances in aviation and the failure of the United States
to keep up with them, they also did not want to hear about it. When Mitchell
pressed the issue of American military aviation incompetence before the public,
the Congress, and the President's Aircraft Board (September 28, 1925) he was
court-martialled by the Army for insubordination. His resignation was forced by
a guilty verdict and a sentence on January 27, 1926 of suspension without pay for
five years, BURLINGAME,SUpa, at 172-73. The episode shows how pitifully unaware
American leadership was of aviation reality even at the time the Air Commerce
Act was being enacted. Mitchell and air power were finally and permanently rec-
ognized in the United States on December 7, 1941 with the surprise attack by
Japanese carrier based aircraft on the United States port at Pearl Harbor. This
attack devastated the American Pacific fleet.
The ultralight vehicle has military possibilities too. As noted above, they are
under consideration by the United States and foreign military forces for observa-
tion purposes, and are presently capable of carrying light machine guns and rock-
ets. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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the existing offices would be responsible for the various
tasks necessary to implement the new Act, the Senate Re-
port notes: "The Department of Commerce has offices in
all our seaports where its Bureau of Navigation and its
Steamboat Service carry on their work. These offices can
readily be used without additional expense for necessary
aviation inspectors who must provide for the examination
of pilots and airplanes. . .," and calls the new act a plan
of "comparative simplicity." 64
C.Development of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
The legal development instituted by the Air Commerce
Act was not capable of coping with the developing tech-
nology and business of aviation. The Europeans, as in
1919, continued to lead the way in international legal de-
velopment. The Aeronautics Branch of the Department
of Commerce became snowed under with new responsi-
bilities. In 1934 it became the Bureau of Air Commerce
under the supervision of the Department of Commerce.
At the same time Senator McCarran guided the Airmail
Act of 193465 through Congress. Senator McCarran had
pressed for, and in this act achieved, Presidential author-
ity to appoint a commission of five members for the pur-
pose of forming a unified aviation policy for the country.
This commission was the Federal Aviation Commission.
The commission's efforts resulted in the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 193866 which had roughly the same purpose as the
Air Commerce Act of 1926: development of commercial
aviation with a high standard of safety. The Air Com-
merce Act made the commission independent of the com-
merce department. In June, 1940, the agency created by
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 was split into two agen-
cies. Commerce and safety would be handled by the new
- S. REP. No. 2, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1923). Other changes were in the wind.
The report notes that, "care has been taken to avoid constitutional entanglements
and intrastate flying is left to the control of the states. Id. at 8.
Act of June 12, 1934, Pub. L. No. 308, 48 Stat. 933 (1934).
'6 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 706, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
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Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). The reorganization also
created the Civil Aviation Administration (CAA), to which
in 1948 the CAB delegated a number of rule-making pow-
ers, notably the power to investigate accidents involving
aircraft under 12,500 lbs. gross weight 67 - the size of a
small cargo plane (such as the famous Douglas DC-3/C-
47). The CAA was transferred to the Department of
Commerce in 1950.68
Despite the tinkering, aviation regulation was not keep-
ing up with the technological developments in aviation.
One of the prime areas of safety concern continued to be
airspace allocation and a perceived need for improve-
ments in radio navigation and air control system.69 Con-
gress knew the airways were simply too crowded for the
available controls to insure air safety. The Bureau of the
Budget knew it, and, on May 4, 1955 appointed a commit-
tee to study the matter (The Harding Committee, or Avia-
tion Facilities Study Group). The President knew it, and
in February, 1956, appointed a Special Assistant for Avia-
tion Facilities Planning to study the matter. 70 But, once
again, it took a disaster to spark real action in the federal
government.
In 1926, economic pressure on the fledgling airlines
and public fear of unsafe skies prompted federal regula-
tion of aviation.7' In 1956, thirty years later, it was the
Grand Canyon midair collision. Out of that disaster came
67 14 C.F.R. § 1 (1985).
- H.R. Rep. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1958 U.S.Code
Cong. & Ad. News 3741, 3743. See generally, R. BURKHARDT, THE FEDERAL AVIA-
TION ADMINISTRATION (1966).
w Most notably the TACAN-VOR/DME controversy. TACAN (Tactical Air
Navigation) is a military guidance system, while the VOR(Very high frequency
Omnidirectional Range)/DME (Distance Measuring Equipment, a ground-based
transponder) had been developed around civil needs. The jet age placed new
requirements on the military, and it was desirable to have a single system all could
use. H.R. Rep. 2869, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). Another law indicating space
allocation problems was the Federal Airport Act Pub. L. No. 377, 60 Stat. 170 (to
relieve overcrowding of ground facilities).
70 See generally H.R. Rep. No. 1272, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). See also
WHITNAH, supra note 44, at 213-245.
7' See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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the Federal Aviation Administration. 72 Congress, "feel-
ing the need for immediate action following the recent
tragic air accidents," (the Grand Canyon midair was the
most sensational but was not alone) received identical
bills for the new agency.73
With an understanding of the background leading to
the creation of the agency, one can realize that it was no
quirk that the preamble to the House Report states: "The
principle purpose of this legislation is to establish a new
Federal Agency with powers adequate to enable it to pro-
vide for the safe and efficient use of the navigable airspace
by both civil and military operations. 74
The section of the legislative history dealing with Safety
Rulemaking Authority goes a bit further, pointing out:
The problem of to whom and in what terms the Congress
should delegate the safety rulemaking authority needed to
carry out the purposes and intent of this legislation was
one of the most difficult faced by the committee...
Rulemaking processes should not lag far behind advances
in equipment and techniques.
Even in so-called visual flight rule flying [as in Grand Can-
yon], regulations are needed in the interest of safety, as
shown by experience prior to passage of the Air Com-
merce Act of 1926.
How to insure the maximum possible safety and efficiency
12 The accident has been thoroughly documented elsewhere, as many lurid
events are. Of special interest to lawyers is the account of one participating plan-
tifrs attorney, Stuart Speiser. S. SPEISER, LAWsUIT 192-261 (1980). Two aircraft,
a TWA Lockheed 1049A Constellation and a United Air Lines Douglas DC-7 ar-
rived at the same place at the same time four miles above the Grand Canyon, in
clear air and, arguably, under the control of the CAA Air Routes Traffic Control
Center (ARTCC) at Salt Lake City. All aboard, 128 people, died. The wreckage
fell in two areas 8 miles apart. Defense lawyers for the airlines initially denied that
an accident had even occurred, and CAB reports confirming the nature of the
crash were not permitted into evidence under federal statute. Id. at 197.
I See H.R. Rep. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3741; S. Rep. No. 3880, 85th Cong., 2d Sess (1958),
reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 855.
74 H. Rep. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3741 (emphasis added).
under proper regulations, impartially enforced, is one of
the major problems in connection with this legislation.75
The report concludes: "It is the intent of the legislation
that the Administrator SHALL discharge his rulemaking
powers in a fair and impartial manner to promote the
public interest and to provide for the national defense.
76
The emphasis continues under the Title-by-Title Sum-
mary of General Powers: "Under this title the Administra-
tor is required to prescribe air-traffic rules and
regulations governing the flight of aircraft. . . .This...
places the responsibility for the safe and efficient use of
the navigable airspace. . .in the hands of the
Administrator." 77
Eventually, Congress backed away from its original
forceful mandate. In a stroke of political mastery it in-
serted an escape clause capable of swallowing the entire
act: "The Administrator is authorized to grant exemp-
tions from any rule or regulation prescribed by him under
this title if he finds that such exemption is in the public
interest and, in addition, there is a general exemption
from the Administrator's air-traffic control powers in case
of a military emergency." 78
This is precisely what has been done under section 103.
Ultralight flying machines and their pilots have been care-
fully exempted from much of the body of the Federal Avi-
ation Regulations ("FAR").79
Is this exemption consistent with the spirit of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act and its predecessors, and the legislative
intent behind them? If it is not, what are the possible so-
lutions available to those who may be either interested or
damaged parties in seeing that a proper regulation is
passed or redress is made available?





79 The FARs comprise 14 C.F.R. §§ 1-199.31 (1985).
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this paper now turns to the background of the FARs in
general and 14 C.F.R. § 103 in particular.
D. Development of the FARS and Section 103
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, is con-
tained in title 49 of the United States Code.80 Safety Reg-
ulation of Civil Aeronautics, Subchapter VI of the Act,
begins at section 1421. The general mandate issued by
Congress is that the FAA "is empowered and it shall be
[the Secretary of Transportation's] duty to promote safety
of flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
and revising from time to time," such minimum standards
for the design, materials and workmanship of airframes
and powerplants, 8 1 the issuing of airman certificates,82
and airworthiness certificates as the FAA "may find neces-
sary to provide adequately for. . . safety in air
commerce."83
The exemption clause of the original 1958 Act, capable
of swallowing the entirety of Subchapter VI has been pre-
served.,4 "The Secretary of Transportation from time to
time may grant exemptions from the requirements of any
rule or regulations prescribed under this title if he finds
that such action would be in the public interest. '8 5
The safety regulation powers delegated by Congress to
the FAA are made more remarkable by the presence of a
subdelegation clause giving the FAA the power to transfer
its certification powers to private individuals provided
only that they are "properly qualified," or even to the su-
,o 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1982).
- Id. § 1421 (a) (1982).
" Id. § 1422(a) (1982). Underinclusively referred to generally as "pilot's
licenses." These actually included ratings for all aircrews, flight instructors,
powerplant and airframe mechanics, flight controllers and other rated individuals.
Id. § 1301(7) (1982)
8- Id. § 1423(c) (1982). These are inspection certificates that certify the capac-
ity of aircraft to perform within certain discrete capability ranges. Roughly similar
to automobile or marine inspections, they are in practice, quite exacting with cer-
tain notable exceptions, namely ultralight flying machines.
84 Id. § 1421(c) (1982).
N Id.
pervised employees of such individuals, for the examina-
tion, inspection and testing necessary under Subchapter
VI. 8 6 This practice resulted in the development of various
positions in which private citizens serve as FAA examin-
ers. For example, Designated Flight Examiners are au-
thorized to administer tests to pilots and issue certificates
to them after a proper demonstration of aeronautical
knowledge and skill, and collect fees for these services.
Similarly, Designated Medical Examiners are qualified
medical doctors who perform the flight physicals required
of all flight crewmen. This practical system allows flight
privileges to a far greater number of citizens than the
FAA, with its limited budget, could possibly examine. 7
FAA regulations implementing the enabling Act's ex-
tensive requirements appear in Title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations. They are extensive, and technically pre-
cise.88 The regulations include general definitions, which
define, aircraft as a device that is used or intended to be
used for flight in the air."'8 9 Hot-air balloons are logically
a subset of aircraft, and are so defined: " 'Balloon' means
a lighter-than-air aircraft that is not engine driven." 90 Air-
planes are also a distinct subset, (defined as an "engine-
driven fixed wing aircraft heavier than air supported in
flight by the dynamic reaction of the air against its
wings". 9 1 Gliders are, roughly, airplanes which are not
engine-driven.92 Ultralight flying machines which are
powered hang gliders, would seem to be covered by this
86 Id. § 1355(a) (1982).
87 The paper will return to this useful paradigm as one way out of the ultralight
dilemma. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
80 It is not the purpose of this article to go into the FARs as a body. A fairly
representative portion is Part 23, Airworthiness Standards. The index to Part 23
14 C.F.R. § 23 (1985), shows the nature of the requirements which must to be met
before any unexempted airplane may be issued an airworthiness certificate. The
FAA requires a certificate before an unexempted airplane (i.e., any airplane ex-
cept an ultralight) may be flown. Ultralight vehicles are exempt from Part 23.
89 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1985).
90 Id.
?IId.
'32 Id. An increasing number of gliders use engines to gain altitude, but not to
maintain altitude.
UL TRALIGHTS 4351986]
436 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [51
definition. This is not the case: they are, officially, not air-
planes. They are, officially, "Ultralight Vehicles," and are
regulated elsewhere. 3
The FAA's failure to classify ultralights as airplanes also
removes ultralight manufacture, service and marketing
from the requirements of the FARs. 14 C.F.R. § 43 deals
with the maintenance, rebuilding and alteration of "any
aircraft having a U.S. airworthiness certificate ' 94 and "ex-
cept as provided in this section no person may" do so.9 5
Persons who may do so are those manufacturers and re-
pairmen certified by the FAA.96
Ultralight fliers seem intent on pursuing their sport de-
spite the tremendous safety risks involved. The FAA has
refused to address the problem, first by not recognizing it
(in 1918) and then by down playing its importance (in
1956). The FAA seems to be saying, "if it isn't an airplane
then we don't have to treat it like one." They do not even
refer to it as an aircraft, although it is far more of an air-
craft than a tethered hot-air advertising balloon.97 They
have defined away the premise of the need to regulate.
This is not an attempt to heap blame on the FAA, for
other constraining factors have been involved in the rule-
making process, notably the tension induced by Execu-
tive Order 12291 of February 17, 1981.98 This is clear
93 14 C.F.R. § 103 (1985).
(m Id. § 43.1 (1985).
95 Id. § 43.3(a).
"- Id. § 43.3(b)-(h).
97 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Apollo Sleep Products, 164 Ga. App. 404 296 S.E.2d
281,(1982) (a hot air balloon with passenger gondola in flight, though only fif-
teen feet off the ground is "somewhere between" a hang glider and an airplane,
and is, therefore, an aircraft). The 1985 NTSB Ultralight Accidents report, supra
note 9, echoes this sentiment and notes nonsport use problems as well. The re-
porter states, "[tlhe FAA's premise that ultralights need not be regulated because
the activitiy is a sport is not totally consistent with its policy of regulating other
aviation activities which can be considered sport flying." It notes gliders and
manned free balloons as well as amatuer-built aircraft must be inspected, and
their pilots licensed. NTSB SAFETY REPORT supra note 9, at 27.
98 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). Generally speaking,
this order requires that all regulations be reviewed as to their economic impact on
affected parties, and that the economic impact be kept minimally consistant with
the purpose of the regulation.
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from the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that
lead to 14 C.F.R. § 103, which states: "[t]he purpose of
the rules is to provide maximum safety for all users while
imposing the least amount of regulatory control consis-
tent with maintaining flight safety. These objectives are
consistent with, and achieve the purposes of, Executive
Order 12291. . ....
The original rulemaking group had recommended that
existing regulations be amended by grouping ultralight
vehicles with other species of airborne oddities in 14
C.F.R. § 101 (which covers moored balloons, unmanned
free balloons, kites, and unmanned rockets) and to ex-
empt them from or modify for them the requirements for
nonmotorized hang gliders.99 Powered hang gliders
would simply be considered aircraft for all purposes. 00
They were considered beyond the scope of Advisory Cir-
cular No. 60-10 (hang glider safety parameters). Their
operators would have to be licensed pilots, their strength
and performance characteristics would be as rigorous as
for other aircraft. Apparently the subsequent decision to
ease off on the requirements for powered ultralights was
in response to the Executive Order and to pressure from
sporting and manufacturing groups. Ironically, and para-
doxically, the pressure to not regulate (or at least to not
regulate stringently) came at precisely the time when the
real danger of a major disaster had become apparent.
The NPRM listed three recent examples of near disas-
ter, and the Final Rule publication listed a fourth. On
April 11, 1981, a Western Airlines Boeing 727 captain re-
ported a near-miss with an ultralight near Phoenix. On
March 24, 1981, at night, a Mitsubishi-2 (an executive-
type twin engine aircraft) passed between two ultralights
off the end of a runway at Winter Haven, FL. Neither ul-
tralight was operating with lights. NASA Alert Bulletin
("AB") No. 79-86 described a commercial air carrier fly-
46 Fed. Reg. 38,472, 38,474 (July 27, 1981) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. parts
91 & 101).
- Id. at 38,473.
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ing on downwind approach to Raleigh-Durham passing
between two hang gliders. In May, 1981 a single-engine
airplane had a near-miss with an ultralight in Instrument
Flight Rules ("IFR")' 10 weather conditions at 7000 feet
near Paso Robles, California.
The first of these particularly highlights the danger. All
of these incidents occurred after the period (not later than
the March 16, 1974 date of AC No. 60-10) when the FAA
had requested voluntary compliance with generally the
same standards now being raised to the level of regula-
tion.1 0 2 These standards, or parameters, deal with safe
construction techniques such as not taking shortcuts; with
operator safety, such as not attempting to fly inverted in
an ultralight; as well as basic regulatory considerations
such as not approaching commercially-served airfields
and not making low flights over sporting events and other
public gatherings. Voluntary compliance had not worked
in the past, yet that is precisely the system on which the
FAA intends to rely now.
The FAA has chosen not to promulgate Federal Regula-
tions regarding pilot certification, vehicle certification and
vehicle registration, preferring that the ultralight commu-
nity assume the initiative for development of these impor-
tant safety programs. The ultralight community is
expected to take positive action to develop these pro-
grams in a timely manner and gain FAA approval for their
implementation. Should this approach fail to meet FAA
safety objectives, further regulatory action will be
necessary. 10 3
101 Instrument Flight Rules are special regulations applying to aircraft operated
in clouds and limited visibility situations, which require advanced license ratings
and additional instruments and radio controls on the aircraft operating in them.
102 Specifically, the FAA recommended that manufacturers implement quality
control procedures for materials and construction, training procedures, adequate
instructions for the assembly of the kits from which most of these aircraft are built
by their owners; hang glider operators "become familiar" with relevant regula-
tions; and associations and individuals "work closely" with the FAA.
103 14 C.F.R. § 103 (1985). A particularly grim example is listed: A 35-year-old
father of four gave his children, all under twelve years of age rides in his brand-
new ultralight. Fortunately no children were aboard when the nose wire securing
1986] ULTRA LIGHTS 439
Why the FAA believes voluntary compliance will be
forthcoming for regulations when there was little volun-
tary compliance for the "Recommended Parameters" is
unclear. The NTSB report overlooks this as well,' 0 4 but
does offer an observation as to a root of the problem:
"there is no easy way to get the parameter information
out to the ultralight user because the machines are unreg-
istered and thus there is no record of whom to tell when
there is something important to tell.' 0 5 As compliance
with safety regulation really serves the operator's own
best interest (to prevent him from breaking his neck
through stupidity), compliance with either a parameter or
a regulation to stay clear of airports is in the best interest
of the ultralight operator. If he is going to ignore the pa-
rameter then he is going to ignore the regulation, too.1
0 6
III. REMEDIES
A. RESTATEMENT OF PROBLEM
The FAA has created a statute, and in doing so has cre-
point gave way, allowing the wings to fold up and the ultralight to crash, killing
the father. NTSB Report supra note 9, at 26, 281.
1- Id. at 28. But that does not explain why the new owner in the case discussed
supra note 103 who surely knew or should have known that the craft was a one-
person machine, was ready to risk not only his life but his children's lives as well.
One clings to the straw of hope that communication channels and Recommended
Parameters will help.
The NTSB report observes that voluntary programs have been unsuccessful,
and the "potential for serious harm to the public is sufficient to include ultralights
under 14 CFR Part 91 - General Operating and Flight Rules, which govern the
operation of all aircraft in the United States and to require minimum standards
for pilot training and certification, vehicle registration, and vehicle airworthiness
certification. The levels of the standards incorporated in [the manufacturers and
enthusiasts organizations] appear to be appropriate. NTSB REPORT, supra
note 9, at 31.
105 NTSB REPORT, supra note 9, at 31. The ultra light pilot may also ignore
obvious danger, such as being run down by an airplane. However, the dangers of
operating near an airport are not always obvious. For example, wake turbulence
(the vortices left behind by moving aircraft, which drift about and linger for many
minutes behind large aircraft are known for smashing even fairly good-sized air-
craft to the ground and could easily shred an ultralight.
- There are, of course, a number of treatises on tort liability in general. Of
special interest to aviation cases is the three volume S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A.
GANS, AvIATION TORT LAw (1978).
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ated a group of hazards, two of which affect members of
the general public, and of which the public is not aware.
The hazards result from section 103, which permits un-
certified pilots to pursue sport flying in uninspected air-
craft. The FAA requests that these people comply
voluntarily with the FARs, but acknowledges that such
compliance has been spotty in the past. Turbine inges-
tion of the pilot, engine and structural components of an
ultralight by a commercial aircraft will probably produce
catastrophic effects.
There are a number of possible solutions. Probably
none of them can prevent catastrophe, but any of them
might delay the inevitable. All of them have some social
cost. This paper presents them here.
B. PRIVATE REMEDIES
These remedies are not the central thrust of this paper.
Probably the most obvious of these is the tort liability of
the pilot who creates a catastrophe. 0 7 The problem is
that hardly anyone has the type of assets required to cover
the liability for such a disaster. A second tort pocket, also
likely to run dry quickly, is the dealer. The dealer's liabil-
ity is enhanced if in selling the ultralight it has failed to
tell the pilot that there are hazards other than simply los-
ing airspeed and striking the ground. A third potential
defendant, also open to the plaintiff in contract since the
repudiation of contract privity requirements, is that of the
manufacturer. The manufacturer is in a good position to
spread the economic risk through insurance, the cost of
which is passed on to the pilot. But if the manufacturer
has not obtained insurance, and if the damage is consider-
able, then the manufacturer may be found to also have a
shallow pocket. If the manufacturer is to be the acknowl-
edged spreader of risk, then the best way to ensure that
107 H.R. 7298, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 15,456 (1977). The bill
was submitted by Congressman Glenn Anderson of California.
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the manufacturer will be found financially whole is
through agency action.
The most undesirable aspect of the tort remedy is that
it is not prospective in nature. People have to be dam-
aged before the tort action is effective. The private tort
action defendant is not only probably financially unable to
deal with the amount of damage, the action itself is retro-
spective in nature. Fear of tort liability is not going to
deter a pilot who is willing to fly an ultralight. But neither
is the existence of a statute going to provide compensa-
tion when the inevitable accident occurs. It would, how-
ever, provide a stronger plaintiff's case if it can be shown
the ultralight pilot was in violation of the law.
C. PUBLIC REMEDIES
There are three sources of public remedies: the Con-
gress; the Executive Branch, here represented by agen-
cies; and the Judiciary. This paper focuses on Judicial
solutions, however, Congress and the Executive Branch
could produce additional solutions. In fact, Congress and
the Executive are arguably in the best position to act with-
out great fanfare. However, Congress and the Executive
are subject to political concerns other than the prevention
of accidents, and generally fail to act until political pres-
sure is applied. Congress's delay in enacting both the Air
Commerce Act and Federal Aviation Act, illustrates that
potential catastrophe is of little concern. Both Congress
and the Executive are aware of their inherent short-sight-
edness as it underlies delegation. The FAA attempts to
act prospectively, but has fallen behind the advance of
technology, perhaps through no fault other than budget
constraints.
D.Congressional Remedies
The Congressional remedy is legislation. The demon-
strated tendency, however, is to delay until something so
outrageous occurs that the Congressional conscience and
constituency pressure forces action.
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One measure that has died, and perhaps should be re-
considered as a solution to this problem, was the pro-
posed Air Travel Protection Act of 1977 (Anderson
Bill). 0 8 The bill was referred to committee and never re-
turned to the floor. The Anderson bill was a form of "no-
fault" insurance, aimed at the domestic commercial air
traveller. The damages provision of the bill applied to
carriers, aircraft and component part manufacturers, the
federal government and any other person legally liable for
an aircraft accident. 0 9 It only had effect if five or more
persons were killed or hospitalized in a single accident, 1 0
or if damages reached a minimum limit of $2.5 million by
any individual person, or $5 million aggregate; or $5000
or more by each of 50 or more persons provided such
damages aggregated to more than $1 million."'
This describes the catastrophic case. In essence, the
Secretary of Transportation would issue an insurance cer-
tificate to the air carrier,"12 who in turn would collect pre-
mium payments as part of the ticket price from the
passenger. 1 3
The other side of the act would have been elimination
of fault issues, waiver of defenses of contributory negli-
gente, charitable immunity, governmental immunity, and
the imposition of a 2-year statute of limitations on com-
pensatory actions. 114 Jurisdiction would lie in federal dis-
trict courts, with venue open. 1 5
108 49 U.S.C. § 1402 (1982).
- Id. § 1404 (4). Presumably usual proximate cause/consequential damages
limits would be applied to determine what constituted a "single" accident.
,,0 Id. § 1401(4).
,I, ld. § 1402(a).
1"2 See id. § 1402(e). This is similar to the international injury compensation
provisions of the Guatamala Protocol. 2 C. SHAWCROSS & M.BEAUMONT, AIR LAW
A 219 (4th ed. 1984) (modified by Montreal Protocols 3 & 4 (1975), reported in 2 C.
SHAWCROSS & M. BEAMONT, A242-A246 (1975).
113 See H.R. 7298, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977).
,,4 See 49 U.S.C. § 1404(b)(1) (1982).
115 An interesting discussion of this measure by a panel of aviation lawyers may
be found in THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS, THE FUTURE OF Avi-
ATION TORT LITIGATION 10-23 (1978). The bill came on the heels of 555 deaths in
the take-off collision of two Boeing 747s, one owned by Pan American, the other
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This would be of no assistance at all to the domestic
private air traveller, but the private traveller plaintiff
probably has a better chance of recovering under a tort
action, simply because he is not one of a large number of
passengers. The defendant pocket is probably going to
be deep enough to handle some damage. Most private
flights involve a relatively small number of passengers.
Another way in which Congress could act would be to
overrule the regulation passed by the FAA. It is unlikely
to do so, for political reasons. Further, it may not be
readily possible to do so if opposed by the FAA and the
President, following I. N. S. v. Chadha. 1 16 The Federal Avia-
tion Act does not appear to contain such a clause, so at
first it would not appear to be affected by Chadha. But the
case does point out to the Executive branch, and the
agencies, in stark light, that so long as they resist Con-
gressional encroachment on existing power, it will take a
two-thirds vote of Congress to overwhelm that resistance.
Any concept of "inherent" power to review is certainly
dead after Chadha, if indeed it ever existed."i 7  If the
by KLM, in the fog at Tenerife, Canary Islands, on March 27, 1977. Again, trag-
edy before action by Congress.
1- 103 S. Ct. 2766 (1983). Chadha, an alien, resisted deportation. An Immi-
gration Law Judge ("ILJ") acted to suspend the deportation proceedings. The
House of Representatives by resolution, pursuant to Section 14 4 (c)(2) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(S) (1982), vetoed the action of the
ILJ. The Supreme Court held the veto-by-resolution clause of the Act unconstitu-
tional. Neither house of Congress, nor the Executive, may delegate its legislative
authority to a house of Congress. Bicameralism is essential. Justice White, dis-
senting, pointed out that such ruling guts nearly two hundred similar clauses in
which, as he characterizes the action by the Congress, the legislature has merely
reserved from the various Acts affected a right of review not rising to a threat to
the separation of powers. 103 S. Ct. at 2792. The United States Constitution, of
course, gives the power to Congress to override Executive branch regulation by
majority vote in both houses, or a Presidential veto by two thirds majority in both
houses. It may also overrule the Judiciary by the constitutional amendment pro-
cess. In Chadha Congress had attempted to override Executive Branch regulation
by majority vote of either house.
,,7 "Neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate contends that absent
the veto provision in section 244(c)(2), either of them, or both of them acting
together, could effectively require the Attorney General to [act one way] once the
Attorney General, in the exercise of legislatively delegated authority, had [acted
the other way]." 103 S.Ct. at 2785 (extensive footnote omitted). There does re-
main the informal control by Congress via the budget. This blurs the line be-
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power to review agency action exists at all, the court con-
tinues, it exists in the courts, which, "can always 'ascertain
whether the will of Congress has been obeyed.' "1118 The
Federal Aviation Act does not appear to have such a reser-
vation of review clause, and is not among those cited by
Justice White.
E. Executive Branch Remedies
This Executive Branch is undoubtedly the best
equipped to correct the problem. It is here, after all, that
the regulatory aspect of the problem originated (the other
aspect being the technological advance). Hopefully this is
precisely where solutions of a preventive nature will arise.
One executive agency which could act is the FAA itself.
Since the FAA has already given the matter considerable
thought and elected to exempt ultralight machines and
their operators from FAA examination as to fitness, this
paper will proceed without discussing how the FAA might
resolve the problem. Regulatory suggestions which the
FAA might wish to consider follow." 9
An alternative agency which, arguably, has powers in
this area is the FTC.12 0 (This paper gives no special atten-
tween law and power. In the ultimate showdown Congress does hold the final
power.
Id. at n.16, citing Yakus v. United States 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944).
See infra note 175 and accompanying text. See supra note 105 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of NTSB recommendations. Note that the NTSB is
merely an advisory agency with no rulemaking power beyond its own operational
requirements. It can however, exert pressure on the executive branch. The
NTSB is currently exerting pressure on the FAA concerning ultralights.
12o The FAA has determined that ultralight vehicles are not aircraft and never
refers to them as such. This was done so that they would not be subject to regula-
tions affecting aircraft except by specific reference within 14 C.F.R. § 103 (1985).
If ultralights are not aircraft then they may still be a consumer product. In fact
they are advertised and sold as such, in user-assembled kits, often as just one
more product in a dry goods stores inventory. As the FTC has a general power to
protect consumers from "substantial injury," it could require minimum standards
for the product and for advertising and sales of the kits. Safety instructions, along
with warnings could be included in assembly kits. The FTC could also require
minimum standards for construction and quality controls in the kit manufacturing
process, perhaps even licensing of the manufacturers. For a current, thorough
review of the FTC's extraordinary power, see Lane, Schechter and the FTC: A Roving
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tion to the Consumer Product Safety Commission. CPSC
action would undoubtedly be as unwelcome by the FAA as
FTC action for the same reasons discussed here. It is,
however, an additional consideration for the Executive
Branch.) The FAA, it is assumed, would strongly oppose
any action by the FTC on the matter of ultralight aircraft.
The legislative history of the FAA and the Air Commerce
and Federal Aviation Acts gives this position considerable
support. The fragmentation of authority over the airways
up until the 1958 Act was the major cause of the problems
leading up to the Act. Federal preemption of authority
from the states is specific. 12  There was also included a
repealer clause for inconsistent law. 122 Areas otherwise
reserved to the FTC are specifically assigned to the CAB
as they relate to aviation. 123
But the regulations do not say that the FAA shall have
design control over non-aircraft. The FAA has gone far
out of its way to insure that ultralight vehicles are not con-
sidered aircraft (thus exempting them from, e.g., registra-
tion requirements under 49 U.S.C. § 1401(c)). It could be
argued that having exempted ultralights from aircraft sta-
tus, the FAA cannot suddenly shift its position and claim
control over their manufacturing and packaging under the
claim that they are, indeed, aircraft. But the FAA response
would be that the exemption clause of 49 U.S.C.
Commission, 39 Bus. LAw. 153 (1983). The FAA says Experimental Class aircraft,
those built by uncertified manufacturers or by private citizens, cannot be resold.
14 C.F.R. § 23 (1985). An ultralight might arguably fall under this restriction,
and thus could not be legally resold. But they are not aircraft, and therefore, are
exempt from the limitation on Experimental Class resales. If they can be resold as
any other consumer product, then the FTC has the power to control that market.
12, 49 U.S.C. § 1305 (1982) (held not to be, in and of itself, preemptive of state
laws bearing on liability and negligence). See Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Ser-
vice, 435 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1970).
122 Where the policies of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6201 (1982), came into conflict with decision making by the FAA it was held that
the former should supplement, not preempt, the latter. Ohio/Indiana Points
Nonstop Service Investig. (1971), CAB Adv. Dig., 25, (February, 1978).
125 See 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7) (1982). The prevention of unfair, deceptive,
predatory or anticompetitive practices in air transportation is assigned to the
CAB. Under sunset provisions this will be reassigned.
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§ 1421(e) preempts any purported FTC power to step in
merely because the FAA has chosen to not require com-
pliance of a narrow category of vehicles.
F. Judicial Remedies
Assuming that Congress and the Executive Branch will
not act to alleviate the hazard created by 14 C.F.R. § 103,
there remain potential judicial remedies for the failure of
the statute. These are the least desirable, largely due to
the necessity for fault-finding in legal action.
Courts function in two ways, prospectively and retro-
spectively. In the prospective mode their key tools have
been the mandamus and injunction writs. Injunction, the
staying by the court of a proposed action, is inapplicable
to the problem under consideration. In the post-ho'c, ret-
rospective mode, several tools are available, notably (for
the purposes here) the redistribution of damages through
the tort action. This paper will focus on mandamus and
tort action, the former to force action and the latter to
adjust damages should no FAA action be taken.
1. Mandamus
It is important to consider initially whether the remedy
of mandamus is being requested in order to correct
agency inaction or undesirable action. The difference is
one of nonfeasance versus malfeasance. The action of the
FAA might be characterized either way. It could be ar-
gued that the FAA action is malfeasance due to the posi-
tive steps taken to create a regulation exemption. On the
other hand, the situation could be perceived as agency re-
fusal to regulate an identified hazard within its congres-
sionally stipulated area of responsibility and thus be
characterized as nonfeasance.
If one argues nonfeasance, a useful analytical matrix is
available. 124 Assuming that the FAA inaction is the prob-
lem here, then the courts will wish to decline to review for
124 See, e.g., NoteJudicial Review of Administration Inaction, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 627
ULTRA LIGHTS
four traditional reasons: lack of clear congressional intent;
judicial inability to analyze the problem of the case; pre-
sumptive availability of political controls; and justiciability
failure.
The first three objections by the court are debunked for
this case. The history of air law generally, and federal
safety law in particular, makes it plain that Congress does
not wish this type of hazard to exist. Judicial inability is a
make-weight argument and gloss for rejecting a case the
court simply does not want to hear. This paper acknowl-
edges that political controls are preferred but often fail to
function in a timely way. Justiciability, however, remains a
key problem and is present in both the inaction and faulty
action cases.
a. The Problem ofJusticiability
Three barriers to one seeking judicial review of section
103 compose the problem of justiciability: finality of
agency decision, commitment by Congress to agency dis-
cretion, and standing. The first of these is satisfied by the
issuance of the final regulation by the FAA, after following
appropriate rulemaking procedures. Finality was reached
when the final rule went into effect on October 4, 1982.125
The second, required under section 10 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act,' 26 prevents courts from reviewing
agency action "committed" to agency discretion unless
that discretion has been abused.' 27
(1983). This is a thorough and thoughtful article, extremely important reading
for anyone challenging an agency.
,2- 47 Fed. Reg. 38,770 (1982).
126 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982).
127 Id. § 706(2)(a). In analyzing whether there is a commitment to agency dis-
cretion and whether there has been an abuse of that discretion, the federal courts
have looked to the nature of the regulation under challenge and the nature of the
enabling act. See, e.g., Kliendienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 763 (1972) (no judicial in-
tervention on decision of Attorney General to decline waiver of stautory exclusion
of alien); Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1979) (courts are ill-equipped
to superintend economic and managerial decisions of the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration with respect to rent increases for federally subsidized housing);
United States ex. rel. Schonbrum v. Commanding Officer, 403 F.2d 37 (2d Cir.
1929) (judicial review of correctness of discretionary refusal to grant hardship ex-
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The third justiciability requirement, standing, presents
more of a problem. Standing has not been granted by the
statute itself. There are two barriers within the standing
issue itself: Constitutional and "prudential" limitations.
Under Article III of the Constitution, plaintiffs as a group
are limited to those who can show "injury in fact." This
may be economic, 2 8 quasi-economic, 29 or literal. The
Administrative Procedure Act has carved out a hole in the
relatively harsh Constitutional barrier through section
702, which provides for review in cases where the plaintiff
is "suffering a legal wrong. . .or is adversely affected or
aggrieved."'' 30 The Supreme Court has shown a willing-
ness to allow plaintiffs to fall within the "zone of interest
of the statute" and thus have standing to seek review of
their claims.' 3 '
Assuming such standing can be shown, the court will
review the complaint. But it will still refrain, for pruden-
tial reasons, from interference with certain types of
agency action and inaction. This paper now examines the
boundaries of the judicial limitation.
b. Judicial Review of Agency Abuse of Discretion
The capacity of the courts to intervene in the face of
agency delay and inaction is somewhat more problematic
emption to reservist should be declined). See also Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (Such exceptions will be viewed, "very nar-
rowly.") In the situation of 14 C.F.R. § 103, there is, in view of the legislative
history of the Act and the agency history of strict and thorough regulation of air-
men and aircraft, certainly enough "law to apply."
128 Association of Data Processsing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970).
1' Cf Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). (Sierra club has no standing
to sue for environmental damage since there is no individual injury).
,.- 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
is, Camp, 397 U.S. at 153-57. The court will examine the Act to see if the plain-
tiff is within the class of persons protected by the statute, and the purposes of the
statute. Thus a plaintiff in an action concerning 14 C.F.R. § 103, (1985) would
have to be someone vulnerable to a harm from which the Act was designed to
protect. Such a person might be another pilot, regular passenger, or shipper in
air commerce.
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than their capacity in the face of abuse of discretion.'32
Mere slowness of the agency is usually not cause for judi-
cial intervention, unless the delay becomes outrageous. 3
Even if the court is inclined to order an agency to act, the
order will probably be limited, not dictating what decision
the agency will make. Rather, the court will merely order
the agency to decide something one way or the other. Par-
ticularly clear on this point is the 1983 case of Public Citi-
zen Health Research Group v. Auchter. 134 The trial court
framed the issue as whether the Secretary of Labor's deci-
sion, based on the record before him, was arbitrary and
capricious, and thus abuse of discretion. In arriving at its
holding the court first examined the OSHA enabling leg-
islation under which "the Secretary of Labor is required
to issue an emergency temporary standard regulating in-
dustrial exposure to a toxic substance if he finds that em-
ployees are placed in 'grave danger' from exposure...
and that such a standard is 'necessary' to protect the em-
ployees."'' 35 The court next acknowledged that "Con-
gress has shouldered the courts with the responsibility of
overturning agency action which is found to be arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law," under 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A). t 36 The
court stated further:
This standard of review contemplates a searching and
thorough investigation, however, administrative determi-
nations are necessarily accorded substantial deference in
132 B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 613 (1976).
is Chicago, B. & Q R.R. v. Ill. Commerce Comm., 82 F. Supp. 368 (N.D. Ill.
1949).
'- 554 F. Supp. 242 (D.D.C.), revd, 702 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The Occu-
pational Health and Safety Administration ("OSHA") had conducted a long series
of studies on the effects of ethelene oxide, a sterilant and process chemical, in the
work place, and had set a worker exposure maximum. New studies presented by
the plaintiff indicated a higher risk than the defendant OSHA had previously rec-
ognized indicating, plaintiff argued, that a lower maximum acceptable exposure
level should be immediately promulgated by OSHA through the extraordinary
remedy of the Emergency Standard Order. Defendant OSHA disagreed on the
emergency nature of the situation and declined to issue the emergency standard.
135 554 F. Supp. at 244, citing 39 U.S.C. § 655 (c) (1982).
-, 554 F. Supp. at 245.
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recognition of an agency's expertise and competence in
the areas it regulates. Courts will not substitute their judg-
ment for that of the agency.
The standard of review is a narrow one requiring the court
to determine whether the agency acted within the scope of
its authority, whether the challeged decision was "based
on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether
there has been a clear error ofjudgment." Citizens to Pre-
serve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-416
(1971) ("the agency must articulate a 'rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made' ") .... In
Overton Park the Court "interpreted the arbitrary and ca-
pricious test to require a 'substantial inquiry' subjecting
the agency's action to a 'thorough, probing, in-depth
review. "137
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit agreed with the standard of review used
by the district court, 3 8 but reversed the judgment of the
court on its application of that standard to the facts of the
case.
The trial court found a level of danger so compelling as
to substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the
issuing of the emergency order. The appellate court did
not feel the situation was so grave as to warrant the drastic
measure sought by the plaintiff, but found the situation
sufficiently unsettling to order expedited rule-making
proceedings. 39 140 The court suggests a standard by
which agency delays should be measured before a court
should intervene with an order expediting rule-making:
Delays [by an agency] that might be altogether reasonable
in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable
when human lives are at stake. See, e.g., 587 F.2d 329,
334 (C.A. 6 1978); Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin,
428 F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1970)." The risk of
137 Id.
-' Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1157
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
13 Id. at 1158.
140 Id. at 1157.
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human life need not be a certainty to justify expedition. As
in Hardin, 'if petitioners are right,' in their claim that
ethelene oxide presents a serious hazard for a significant
number of workers, then 'even a temporary refusal [to act]
results in irreparable injury on a massive scale.' 428 F.2d
at 1099.141
The court goes on to carve out some exception areas to
this standard. "We would hesitate . . . if such a com-
mand would seriously disrupt other rulemakings of higher
or competing priority."'' 42 But it finds no such barrier on
the facts. And, it states, "We cannot 'compel solutions
where none exist,' but we 'must act to make certain that
what can be done is done.' ,,143 However, the court is
careful in only ordering the agency to act, not ordering
what the agency must decide. On the contrary, the appel-
late court chastised the involvement of the District Court
in the evaluation of scientific evidence:
In light of the mixed fact/policy judgment Congress em-
powered OSHA to make on uncertain evidence, we cannot
say, as the district court did, that the decision not to issue
an ETS [Emergency Temporary Standard] lacked support
in the record. . . . We are not positioned to say that the
expert Agency acted impermissibly in this regard ...
[U]nable to venture even a guess. . .we must defer to the
[agency] determination that the evidence is inadequate [to
necessitate issuance of] an emergency standard. 44
The court is attempting to balance the polarity between
its own burden of carrying on a thorough, probing, in-
depth review, and its deference to the expertise of the
agency. "The fact that the interests at stake are not
merely economic interests in a license or a rate structure,
but personal interests in life and health," 14 and not
merely of the workers themselves but, here in the face of a
141 Id. at 1157, n. 26.
142 Id. at 1158.
143 Id. at 1158, quoting American Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 191 F.2d 492 (D.C.
Cir. 1951).
,4 702 F.2d at 1156.
145 Id.
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carcinogenic and mutagenic compound, their unborn
young, seems to be the trigger for court action. 14 6 It does
so hesitantly, and only orders action take place, but does
not attempt to write the rule for the agency.
In Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Donovan,147 the
United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit stated
that all that is involved is the power to compel the agency
to proceed, "a command to hear and adjudicate, not a
command to tell him how it is to be decided."'' 48 Thus the
FAA can be argued to have fairly unlimited discretion,
based on a record, to act as it expertly decides. But it may
not, and does not in all cases, have the discretion to not
act at all.
In the case of section 103, the agency has acted. The
FAA has made a rule. And it is not so venal as to write a
rule saying only that "ultralight vehicles are hereby not
regulated," rather that they are not subject to all the regu-
lations to which "aircraft" are subjected. The FAA has
dodged the complaint that they have failed to act at all.
Thus it may be fairly said that the remedy of 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2), mandamus, is not going to be available to com-
pel the FAA to promulgate regulation of the ultralight,
unless the court is persuaded that a danger greater than
that danger posed to workers by ethelene oxide is being
presented to a fairly large number of people, although
how many may be required is not clear.' 49
2. Tort
As an alternative to the remedy of mandamus, and as-
suming that the worst or some lesser case has occurred,
146 Id. at 1158.
147 Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Donovan, 274 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1960).
14. Id. at 798.
141, The worst case, ultralight ingestion leading to flameout over an urban area
may not be the most remote. Aircraft tend to congregate in two general areas:
along airways, particularly at navigation aids which are remote from urban areas;
and near airports. The ignorant ultralight flier would be more attracted to the
latter which he can see, than he would be to the former, the existence of which he
would likely be unaware.
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then there remains the problem of apportionment of
damages. This paper has addressed the private tort rem-
edy above, and indicated why it is likely to be less than
satisfactory for the families and estates of the victims.
There remains the potential for tort action against the
government.
Historically, looking towards the government in tort is
an honorable tradition in the law. The government is
often seen as the last insurer of the people. Winning such
an action is another matter. The defendant sovereign has
always made it difficult for the plaintiff, under the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. In the United States, many states
have lowered the immunity bar, some rather com-
pletely. 5 ° The Federal government, of course, has low-
ered the bar in spots, but not completely, through the
Federal Torts Claim Act ("FTCA")."5 '
Whether a function is committed to agency discretion, a
limitation growing out of separation of powers which,
when found to exist makes judicial review less desirable in
the eyes of the courts without absolutely precluding it, or
not is a fuzzy line which has been tested repeatedly. In
Downs v. United States, 152 the court discussed the legislative
background of the FTCA, and described its basic purpose
as to relieve Congress of the burden of processing private
relief bills. Although the record of the legislation leading
to the FTCA referred to examples of, driving a car, as the
type of judgment by an agent for which compensation
might be had, the Supreme Court in Dalehite v. United
150 See, e.g., Campbell v. Indiana, 259 Ind. 284, 284 N.E. 2d 733 (1972).
1s, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1982). As to the social desirability of the
sovereign immunity doctrine, Prosser said, "Just how this feudal and monarchistic
doctrine ever got itself translated into the law of the new and belligerently demo-
cratic republic...is...a bit hard to understand." W. PROSSER, supra note 3,
§ 131. The FTCA is shaped as a rule of general immunity with noted exceptions.
The statutory exceptions to FTCA are at 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982). Of interest
here is section 2680(a): "[the Act shall not exclude] any claim based upon an act
or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execu-
tion of . .a regulation. . .based upon the exercise or performance or failure to
perform a discretionary function .. " 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
1.'2 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975).
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Statesl5 3 specifically rejected such a notion. As the Downs
court observed, "The [Dalehite] 4-3, majority opinion con-
cluded that immunized discretion' includes determina-
tions made by executives or administrators in establishing
plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where
there is room for policy judgment and decision, there is
discretion. Later opinions have suggested a more restric-
tive view of the exception without setting forth clear
guideposts for decision.""'s" The Dalehite opinion, then,
despite the strength of the dissent and lack of full court,
has set the tone for "discretion," and the later opinions
have been even more conservative. 5 5 This type of think-
ing by the court would seem to make the drawn-out
rulemaking that went into section 103 fit cleanly into the
discretionary, immune, category of government actions.
Fortunately, that may not be entirely the case, as is dis-
cussed below.
It is also well to bear in mind that proximate cause limi-
tations begin to appear when discussing possible govern-
mental tort liability. The duty, if there indeed is one, is
from the government to third parties. With or without
controls placed on the flying of these machines, there re-
mains the distinct intervening negligence of the the pilot.
As is mentioned below, pilot negligence can obviate gov-
ernment duty. In addition, there are other possible inter-
.3 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
1'4 Downs, 522 F.2d at 996.
Is, In Dalehite, 8500 claimants asked $200 million in damages, when negligence
in handling and packaging of nitrate fertilizer caused a ship to explode, causing
the Texas City disaster. The majority declared the government was not liable
since the cause of the disaster was the consequence of a cabinet-level discretion-
ary function decision to aid Europe. Justice Jackson vigorously dissented. "The
government insists "that each act or omission upon which the charge of negli-
gence is predicated - the decisions as to discontinuing the investigation of
hazards, bagging at high temperature, [choice] of paper bagging material, absence
of labeling and warning - [each] involved [the] conscious weighing of expediency
against caution and was therefore within the immunity for discretionary acts pro-
vided by the Tort Claims Act." Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 57. Jackson concluded,
"Surely a statute so long debated was meant to embrace more than traffic acci-
dents. If not, the ancient and discredited doctrine that 'The King can do no
wrong,' has not been uprooted; it has merely been amended to read, 'The King
can only do little wrongs.' " Id. at 60.
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vening actors including the manufacturers and
organizations which have undertaken (with the blessing of
the FAA' 56 and in reliance of which, in part, the regulation
was passed in the form it finally took) to inform the ul-
tralight-using public of the dangers to themselves and to
others.' 57 If there is a duty to the passengers, shippers,
owners and crews of the "worst case" commercial jet acci-
dent, it is grounded in reliance by the public on the gov-
ernment's undertaking to control the airway, which public
reliance is always a tenuous theory for a case. 158
The are two classes of aviation torts which involve the
government as the putative defendant: those in which the
government has acted and those in which the government
has failed to act. Which of the two categories is relevant
depends on whether the court characterizes the promul-
gation of section 103 as an act (passing a regulation) or a
failure to act (failure to execute Congressional will as ex-
pressed in the enabling act). As between the two, negli-
gence in performance is the more common, and is
addressed first.
In a recent case, similar in structure to the hypothesized
case under discussion, summary judgment against the
plaintiff, dismissing the complaint, was affirmed on ap-
peal. In Garbarino Cessna v. United States, 15 a four seat gen-
eral aviation craft crashed on takeoff and the pilot died. 160
The plaintiff claimed, in addition to negligent perform-
ance by air traffic control, that the government had tor-
tiously failed to prescribe sufficient safety regulations to
156 14 C.F.R. §§ 103.1 - 103.23 (1985).
151 These manufacturers and organizations include, among others, the United
States Hang Gliding Association, the Experimental Aircraft Association, General
Aviation Manufacturers Association and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association.
1.8 See, e.g. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). (failure of
those in charge of a lighthouse to check the electrical system was "operational"
and involved no discretion). The public was able to put its faith in the govern-
ment, but liability arose for the operational failure, rather than the decision to
maintain or not maintain a lighthouse. If the government is going to act, it must
act properly at the operational level, but it need not so act at the executive level).
151, 666 F.2d. 1061 (6th Cir. 1981).
-0 Id. at 1062.
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assure the crashworthiness of the aircraft.' 6' The court,
after discussing the background of both the Federal Avia-
tion and Federal Torts Claims Acts, was convinced that
the FAA had considered and had acted to promulgate suf-
ficient regulation. 62 "The [FTCA discretionary acts] ex-
ception does bar claims that the United States is liable for
the failure of its officials 'to impose a more strict set of air
safety regulations,Miller v. United States, 522 F.2d 386,387
(6th Cir. 1975), or for the failure of FAA to promulgate
rules and regulations which promote the safety of hang
gliders. Fielder v. United States, 423 F. Supp. 77 (C.D. Cal.
1976). ' ' 163
The court did not stop there. It said, "We further con-
clude that the discretionary function exception also bars
that portion of the claim based on the decision of the FAA
to delegate inspection duties to an inspection department
of the manufacturer. . . . [T]here are sound policy con-
siderations for not extending the Government's liability
to situations involving the alleged negligent issuance of
[airworthiness certificates]. . . .[In effect it would] make
the Government a joint insurer of all activity subject to
safety inspection."' 64 The court then cited with approval
the case of Clemente v. United States,' 65 in which the court
said, "We do not believe that the expanded role of the
federal government in the safety area through such legis-
lation as OSHA indicates an intent of Congress to make
the United States a joint insurer of all activity subject to
inspection under that statute or others."'' 66
Garbarino is important to the present matter for two rea-
sons. Not only does it seem to block characterization of
negligent performance as a nondiscretionary function, it
characterizes safety regulation rulemaking as discretion-
'1( Id. at 1063.
162 Id. at 1065.
'-' Id. at 1066.
10 Id.
105 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1066 (1978).
1- C/emente, 567 F.2d at 1151.
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ary.16 7 It also plainly reaffirms the power of the FAA to
delegate its power without respondeat superior re-
course. 168 Garbarino is in accord with Auchter.169
Whether or not it is desirable to have the government
act as insurer of, as opposed to aid to, aviation is a juris-
prudential and political science question. One author 170
has explored the question of when governments have a
duty to give protection to citizens threatened by harm to
personal interests, with a focus on power relationships.
Power and law, some would argue, are as two sides of an
object: neither exists without the other, and if one side
fails to function, yet the other is still available.
In the case of ultralight aircraft hazards to others, the
tort liability of the government, for now, is clearly non-
existent at law. The FAA has no duty enforceable at law
to make whole those the ignorant pilot of an ultralight
might injure. Whether it has a moral duty is beyond the
scope of this paper, although the point is debatable.
The best remedy a court is going to be able to give is an
issuance of mandamus to license the pilots. But this ex-
traordinary writ, not used lightly, is rarely issued to spec-
ify what, precisely, the agency must do.17 ' The writ could
not tell the FAA to do more than it already has done.
It would seem then, that the best path to relief, if not
through the Executive nor the Judiciary, remains through
the legislature, both houses acting together, or even more
likely, through the political persuasion process.
167 Garbarino, 666 F.2d at 1065.
1- Id at 1066.
16 See supra note 134 and accompanying text, where failure to promulgate a
safety regulation was held an abuse of discretion. Here, arguably, the FAA has not
failed to promulgate, rather failed to promulgate in accord with the spirit of its
1958 enabling act.
170 M. SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT: TORT LAW, POWER & PUBLIC POLICY (1977).
17, Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394 (1976). The court said,
"The remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, used only in extraordinary circum-
stances." Id. at 402. It is only available if a petitioner can establish that he has, "a
clear and present right" to relief and that the duties of the respondent are minis-
terial, plainly defined and peremptory. Albert v. United States District Court, 283
F.2d 61, 62 (6th Cir. 1960).
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IV. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
There is a relatively simple system which the FAA 72 in
its discretion could implement which would remove most
of the hazard presented by section 103.173 Two nations
have already adopted this proposed system, licensing the
source of the problem, the pilot, in such a way that he will
act in a sense of self-preservation and in doing so will also
preserve the lives of others.
Canada and Great Britain have adopted this system. In
Canada civil aviation is controlled by the Air Regulations
and Aeronautics Act. The present Amendment provides
separate definitions for hang gliders and "ultra-light aero-
planes."' 174 The latter are a somewhat broader class of
machines than those fitting 14 C.F.R. § 103, being de-
scribed by wing loading factor and launch weight, but not
by numbers of occupants nor performance characteristics.
,7 This proceeds on the assumption that the state's capacity to control aviation
has been utterly preempted by the Congress. Some recent cases have held this to
be true. Where a municipality attempted to close a federally funded airport at
night, it being a nuisance in the eyes of the local citizens, the court held that the
city could not close a public airport, even though it was not required to make any
ground services (such as fueling facilities) available to air traffic. The municipality
controlled the terminals, but the FAA controlled the runways and airspace.
United States v. New York, 552 F.Supp. 255 (N.D.N.Y. 1982). Analogies to marine
usage are interesting, since access to the air is guaranteed, but limited. Access to
waterways is similarly guaranteed, but limited. But not all waterways are con-
trolled by the federal government and its responsible agencies such as, for exam-
ple, the Corps of Engineers (navigable waterways) and National Park Service
(designated park areas.).
,73 There are also some relatively more complicated ways, such as requirements
of manufacturer insurance, or the Air Transport Protection Act. See supra note
107-115 and accompanying text. . Not only are they more complicated, and ex-
pensive, they are retrospective. The NTSB Safety Study, supra note 9, also sug-
gests a system which this paper feels is too restrictive of social libertarian needs:
classify the ultralights as airplanes and the pilots as certificated airmen. But that
fails to consider the monetary costs of such status, particularly airworthiness certi-
fication, which would prohibit many would-be fliers from owning ultralights.
Regulation of ultralight airworthiness focusses on protection of the pilot from his
own assumption of rise and contibutory negligence. The danger society should
forestall, this paper argues, is the danger to itself, not to the individual pilot. Light
aircraft repres.nt a far greater physical hazard to others, passengers for example,
than do ultralights, and thus society has a legitimate interest in the airworthiness
of light aircraft.
174 Sec. 101(1). For clarification purposes, Canadian and British spellings are
used in this section of this paper.
UL TRALIGHTS
The Canadian ultra-light craft can be allowed higher ca-
pacities, because the operator must be licensed. The
hang glider is exempt from registration. Ultra-light aero-
planes were also, until April, 1983.175 None of the craft
are required to have airworthiness certificates. 176 But af-
terJuly 1, 1983, operators (pilots) of all aircraft, including
ultra-light aeroplanes, are required to hold a "valid and
subsisting personnel license." Hang glider pilots are ex-
empt from license requirements.17 7
In Great Britain, a similar scheme is implemented by
the Civil Aviation Act of 1982, and Statutory Instrument
No. 1965. Ultralights are classed as aircraft, but as a
mechanically-driven aeroplane (Self-launching motor
glider).' 78 They must be registered 79 and the pilot must
be licensed' 80 even for flying a glider 8 ' but the aircraft
itself need not be subject to the rigorous airworthiness
certification process, provided it is used for fairly narrow
(sport) purposes.18 2 The gross take-off weights are some-
what heavier than those allowed by 14 C.F.R. § 103, up to
150kg (330 lbs.) 183
It would be enough, this paper argues, to require the
pilot to have a simple, mail-in written examination, 184 or
to submit himself, and perhaps his ultralight too, for ex-
amination by a Designated Examiner or concerned private
organization, that would force him to consciously recog-
nize not only the dangers of the sky to himself, but the
danger he represents to others. Further, it would not be
,7.5 Amend. 36, secs. 200, 200.1 Uan, 1983).
176 Amend. 35, sec. 210 (Nov., 1982).
177 Amend. 37, secs. 400.1, 400 (May, 1983).
,78 Sched. I, Part A, S.I. No. 1965 (1980).
179 Id. Part 1, § 3.
1"o Id. Part 2, § 6.
18, Id.
''2 Id. § 8.
183 NTSB Report supra note 9, at 31. The report also examined regulations in
Australia and Federal Republic of Germany and evidently found a range of regula-
tions similar to the degree observed by this paper.
184 This would include such subjects as the national airspace system, simple
weather analysis, basic flight rules, basic aerodynamics and special hazards such as
wake turbulence and mountain waves.
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too much to require manufacturers to utilize some sort of
radar-reflective construction (such as aluminized mylar
wing panels) which would assist air traffic control in spot-
ting the ultralight and thus be able to warn other pilots of
the presence, if not intent, of the craft. Such a regulation
would be well within the constraint guidelines of Execu-
tive Order No. 12,291185 urging consideration of the ex-
pense and counter-libertarian aspects of federal
regulation. 186 Such regulation would encourage the tech-
nological advance of aviation, permit the libertarian fool
to break his own neck, but forestall the day when he will
break his neighbor's neck as well.
46 Fed. Reg. 13,193. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
If the FAA does not want to do this, the capacity and apparent willingness of
the FTC to regulate the safety of consumer goods, which these vehicles arguably
are, remains an alternative source of regulation. Understandably, in view of the
disasterous results of earlier multi-agency control of aviation, it would be better to
keep all aviation regulation under one agency, and that should be, by all logic, the
FAA.
